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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of
OLIVE K. PETERSON, Deceased
SHIRLEY B. HIGBEE, Appellant,
vs.
VIRGLE GILMORE and
EUGENE EDWARD BUTCHER,
Respondents.

I
Case No.
12307

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondents agree with appellant's Statement of
the disposition in the lower court, but add one fact-At
the hearing of the Motion for Amendment of Judgment,
October 9, 1969, Orville Isom's affidavit in support of
the Motion, was considered by the court without objection by appellant. The affidavit is not in the transcript,
but its content is described in Judge McCune's Order,
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dated September 30, 1970 (Record Page 9, Paragraph
c). The affidavit restated that Mr. Isom gave decedent
an original, and no copy, of her Will.

RELIEF SOUGHT
Respondents pray the appeal be dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree that the decedent, Olive K.
Peterson, executed a valid will, with Orville Isom acting
as her attorney, on September 14, 1953; that before her
death Mrs. Peterson may have made statements that she
was destroying her will, but that no witness ever actually
saw her do it; that her revoked will has never been produced or seen; and that the unrevoked, executed, original of her will is now in the court's file.
Respondents disagree with appellant's Statement
of Facts in one particular. Appellant states at the top of
Page 4 of her Brief that Mr. Isom had no recollection of
making the will, and so could not remember whether or
not he made a copy of it. In fact, Mr. Isom remembered
specifically the actual execution of the will. (Trans. P.
4, L. 7-P. 5, L. 12). Mr. Isom also remembered, and
testified, unequivocally, that he gave her the original of
the will, that he did not give her a copy, and that the only
copy prepared, was his office copy, which he still had in
his possession. (Trans. P. 5, L. 10-12; P. 7, L. 22-25; P.
2

9, L. 13-16; and Affidavit referred to in Record, P. 9,

nc).

The point in Mr. Isom's testimony where he indicated uncertainty, is that when called by appellant, after
Mrs. Peterson's death, responding spontaneously to the
call, he stated that he didn't recall having drawn the
will. (Trans. P. 7, L. 26-P. 8, L. 6). At the time of his
testimony, however, he had reviewed his file, refreshed
his recollection, and testified without equivocation, that
he prepared only the original of the will which he delivered to Mrs. Peterson, and a copy of the will, which
he retained, and still had, in his file, and that he never
gave her a copy nor a duplicate of the will.
Respondents add to the Statement of Facts as follows. Mrs. Peterson did not intend to disinherit respondent, Eugene Edward Butcher. (Trans. P. 31, L. 23-28;
P. 36, L. 15-19). Her relationship with him was close.
She raised him from age 6. He lived with her for 12
years. (Trans. P. 12, L. 3-28). They called each other
"mother" and "son." (Trans. P. 13, L. 2-6). Decendent's
relationship with appellant, her blood daughter, had
been poor. She had feared that Shirley didn't like her,
but Shirley was attentive to her during the last of her
life. (Trans. P. 33, L. 20-P. 34, L. 7; P. 35, L. 6-11.)
Through the entire period, from execution of the will to
her death, her relationship with Mr. Butcher remained
good. (Trans. P. 17, L. 27-P.18, L. 20). Decedent
was a business woman. (Trans. P. 6, L. 1-13). She lived
six months after the purported Will burning. She was
familiar with probate, her husband's estate having been
probated. (Trans. P. 6, L. 17-22), but she made no
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effort to have a new will drawn during that period, although a failure to draw a new will, if the old one had
actually been destroyed, would disinherit her foster son,
respondent, Mr. Butcher, which was not her intent. If,
in fact, she burned an envelope saying that it contained
her will, this was a charade of some kind on her part because she had neither the will nor copy in her possession
to destroy. There is no conflict in the evidence of any
kind on this point. It is surmise, but the possibility is real,
that Mrs. Peterson intended simply to get the best of attention from her daughter, appellant, during her remaining lifetime by leading her to believe that she had destroyed her will, and would someday write another, but
actually simply didn't intend to do any such thing.

ARGUMENT
THERE IS NEITHER EVIDENCE NOR LAW
TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF REVOCATION
OF THE WILL.

If decedent had wished to revoke her will, she could
have done so. The original and only copy of decedent's
will are both accounted for.Neither are revoked. No new
will nor codicil has turned up. It is a striking fact that
decendent exhibited an envelope saying it was her will,
when it would have been so easy and logical to exhibit
and destroy the will itself, if she had had the will or a
copy, and if she had wanted to do so. (Trans. P. 20, L.
26-P. 22, L. 8).
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There is only one question: Does a pretense of destroying a will, while leaving the will in existence, revoke the will? The question seems to answer itself on its
face. The decendent had to know she was not destroying
the will, so how could she be held to intend that she was?
At the most, decedent is quoted as saying that she destroyed the will, but there is not a shred of evidence that
she actually did so.
"74-1-19, UCA, 1953. Revocation and altera-

tion of written wills.-Except in the cases in this
chapter mentioned, no written will, nor any part
thereof, can be revoked or altered otherwise than:
( 1) By a written will, or other writing of the
testator declaring such revocation or alteration
executed with the same formalities with which a
will should be executed by such testator; or,
( 2) By being burned, torn, cancelled, obliter,..
ated or destroyed, with the intent and for the purpose of revoking the same, by the testator himself
or by some person in his presence and by his direction."
This statute combines two elements as requisite for
an effective revocation of a will by destroying it. First,
the intent to revoke, and second, the actual physical fact
of destruction of the will itself. The physical fact of destruction being not proved, the will is not revoked.
57 Am Jur Wills, Section 460, Page 322 states,

"N ecesity for Overt Act.-The earlier decisions in England that the revocation of a will was merely a matter of
intent and that an overt act was not essential to effect a
revocation led to such uncertainty in the stability of
5

wills, and to such suspicion that wills were being def eated by perjury, that a statute was passed defining what
was necessary to the revocation of a will by the testator
in his lifetime. The various states of this country also
have enacted similar legislation. Accordingly, revocation
is, under modern law, a combination of an intent to revoke and an overt act, except in the limited class of cases
where it results by operation of law. It is an act of the
mind demonstrated by some outward and visible sign of
revocation. The modern rule is that the revocation of a
will required the concurrence of an intent to revoke and
of some act destroying the will or making itself manifest
upon the face of the will, or the execution of a writing
signed and attested in the manner provided by law. The
unexecuted intention of a testator to revoke his will is of
no consequence, and an unaccomplished attempt of a
testator to destroy or revoke his will is equally futile."
In Re Johannes' Estate, 227 P.2d 148, (Kans. 1951).
Gregory v. Susong, 205 SW 2d 6 (Tenn). 95 C.J.S.
Wills, Section 270 (oral declaration of revocation not
effective) , Section 280 b ( 1) .

It might be argued that decedent was lacking in
mental competancy and so thought that she was destroy·
ing the will when she wasn't. However, all evidence in·
troduced by appellant at the hearing supported her
mental competancy. In fact, it must be conceded by ap·
pellant, or the purported revocation of the will would
not be effective. In Re Frandsen's Will, 50 Utah 156,
165; 167 Pac. 362 (it requires the same capacity to re·
voke a will as to make one) .
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Appellant argues in her brief, page 11, "The intent
to revoke a will followed by the revocation of a duplicate,
if there was a duplicate, and an overt act that the testator
thought was the burning of her will, if there was not a
duplicate, certainly should amount to a revocation."
This argument seems to concede that the decendent
did not actually revoke her will at all, but if she might
have thought she had, or had wished to do so, that the
simple intent to revoke without actual revocation, should
suffice. This argument flies in the teeth of the abovequoted statute which is both mandatory and precise as to
manner of revocation. This point has a certain appeal,
but in probate matters, "unflinching loyalty to the law,
both in letter and spirit, is the only sure ground on which
to stand." In Re Wolcott's Estate, 54 Utah 165, 169;
180 Pac. 169, 170; 4 ALR 727.
CONCLUSION
Revocation of decedent's will not being established,
respondents pray that the appeal be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
SAMUEL KING
Attorney for Respondent
Eugene Edward Butcher
and also submitted for and in
behalf of
ORVILLE ISOM
Attorney for Respondent
Virgle Gilmore
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